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Th[ e] sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse , which every 
individual and generation finds in existence as something given , is the real basis of what the 
philosophers have conceived as "substance " and "essence of man," and what they have 
deified and attacked . . . 1 
These words of Marx are part of the motivation of this essay. The vocabulary of modem 
life is made up of the words of the workplace and marketplace, and the thinkers of modernity 
are mainly concerned with work , labor and production . The subject of play survives only at 
a subterranean level in most disciplines, or else has been reduced to something else, with the 
notable exception of philosophy ( and there usually by way of an attempt to enter into a post-
modern realm of thought and expression) . This relative neglect comes at a time when play's 
physicality is undergoing a radical transformation . Sport, for example, is a larger business 
than ever before, athletes and their managers command enormous fees, communities are 
willing to sacrifice their own space and money to house them, and huge sums are invested in 
an athlete's image for the purpose of advertising and entertainment. Advanced technology 
has helped to transform the concept of the spectator and the participant . While its various 
manifestations have multiplied exponentially, however , the concept and experience of play 
itself remains an enigma. 
1Karl Marx, "The German Ideology : Part I," The Ma rx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker, trans . S. 
Ryazanskaya, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978) 165. 
5 
Nevertheless, even though play-as-such is not taken to be an important subject of inquiry 
by many modem thinkers, it is not completely ignored in the various contemporary dominant 
intellectual disciplines. Developmental psychologists are especially interested in coming to 
a precise understanding of what constitutes play, both in the child's mind and the social 
group. Play is also a topic (though usually not a central one) considered by historians , 
aesthetic theorists, anthropologists, biologists , and philosophers, and it has various functions 
in each of these disciplines. The thinkers in question attempt to arrive at a definition, either 
postulating a definition that fits into their project or defining play indirectly through a 
comparison to their primary concern-art, for example, or culture . Neither of these 
approaches are used in this essay; rather, I approach play from the outside in, from the point 
of view of the various intellectual structures that have tried to incorporate it, in a process of 
elimination. By sifting through the paradigms that try to understand play, I hope to come to 
an understanding of play that may be greater than the sum of its paradigms. 
In order for my attempt to make sense, my use of "paradigm" has to be well defined. My 
use of this word owes a heavy debt to Thomas Kuhn : 
In a science . . . a paradigm is rarely an object for replication . Instead, like an accepted 
judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification 
under new or more stringent conditions .... Paradigms gain their status because they are 
more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of 
practitioners has come to recognize as acute. 2 
1'homas S. Kuhn, The Strncture of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science, vol. 2, no. 2 (Chicago : U of Chicago P, 1970) 23. 
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But Kuhn applies "paradigm" to scientific movements, while my application of paradigm to 
non- or quasi-scientific enterprises differs from his. I use paradigm to mean any system of 
thought or belief that attempts to house concepts and give them an internally coherent shape, 
as represented by a community of thinkers, believers, or both . 3 A paradigm is a network of 
both descriptive and normative concepts: it articulates concepts and their connections while 
(often simultaneously) creating an epistemological scheme for understanding and interpreting 
those concepts. A religion, for example, functions as a paradigm under this broad definition, 
as do psychology, Marxism, quantum theory, feminism, and a host of-isms and -ologies. 4 
Paradigms are by no means monolithic; as Kuhn says, they are communities of thought, with 
all the particular disagreements natural to any community of individuals. 5 
I realize that I beg the reader's indulgence with this broad definition, but I use the term 
principally as a heuristic device for making a clear distinction between the concept and 
experience of play and the paradigms that try to articulate and interpret play. Paradigms are 
3I deliberately use the word "shape" instead of "structure" or "form". "Structure" implies hierarchy , an 
edifice with top, bottom, middle and sides. Paradigms, on the other hand , are constantly shifting their contours and 
litnits while retaining coherence-like an amoeba . "Form" is simply too abstract: paradigms don't exist as pure 
information or an unspoken code, but are incarnated in communities of individuals . 
4 The aspect of Kuhn's analysis which deals with anomaly , crisis and progress doesn't hold if applied to 
my broader use of paradigm. Non-scientific communities of thought coalesce , splinter and dissolve for countless 
large and small reasons; only a Hegelian would see some sort of progress in the multiplicity of paradigms (in my 
sense) over time. On 1he other hand, the postmodern blanket critique of all "metanarratives'' (to use Jean-F rany0is 
Lyotard's texm), "signifying discourses," etc., is just as misguided. The mistake is the attempt to somehow unify 
the multiplicity of paradigms, either affirmatively (Hegel) or negatively (the postmoderns) . 
5 As Kuhn points out, "scientific communities can and should be isolated without prior recourse to 
paradigms; the latter can then be discovered by scrutinizing the behavior or a given community's members .... 
A scientific community consists , on this view , of the practitioners of a scientific svecialty'' (Kuhn 176-177 , my 
italics) . In other words , a paradigm (as I use the term) is not only an abstract, intellectual scheme , but also a 
concrete, pragmatic scheme. 
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characterized by various elements of their epistemological and pragmatic schemes : method, 
subject matter, a body of texts , a community of thinkers , a histoiy . Concepts are, variously, 
what designate the subject matter of any given paradigm, what are present in its texts, what 
its community disagrees on (if anything), themes in its histoiy, and so on. 
A paradigm is also simply a system of language for the purpose of articulation . When 
confronted with the experience of play, the members of a paradigm encounter resistance 
because of what Michael Polanyi calls "the tacit component" : 
In order to describe experience more fully language must be less precise. But greater 
imprecision brings more effectively into play the powers of inarticulate judgement required to 
resolve the ensuing indeterminacy of speech . So it is our personal participation that governs 
the richness of concrete experience to which our speech can refer . Only by the aid of this 
tacit coefficient could we ever say anything at all about experience-a conclusion I have 
reached already by showing that the process of denotation is itself unformalizable . 6 
Play eludes attempts at full articulation, mostly for the reason Polanyi describes above : much 
of it is experience , and much of experience is beyond precise language. 
In order to understand the concept of play, I move in two directions, both towards the 
paradigms that use the concept and the components that are present in it . This paper offers 
an evaluative look at some of the various paradigms, and tries to show that a philosophical 
approach to play, one which grounds the human experience of play in the paradoxical 
combination of wholeness and lack inherent in human being itself, gives the best account of 
the experience and the concept. 
6Michael Polanyi , Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: U of Chicago 
P, 1958) 86-87 . 
8 
The history of science is replete with examples of members of one paradigm who try to 
dissolve another paradigm into its concepts, which they then can subsume under their own 
rubric. For example: logicians who try to reduce mathematics to logic, engineers who try to 
reduce thermodynamics to mechanics, or physicists who try to reduce biology to physics. In 
order to do this, the concepts which compose the paradigm-to-be-.dissolved must often 
themselves be dissolved into their components, in order to be recombined and reconstituted 
in new ways (if reconstituted at all). One point of this paper is to show that play resists such 
dissolution, despite the efforts of various thinkers . 
Other students of play have taken a different approach. Mihai Spariosu , for example, is 
critical of any approach to play which attempts to grasp it as if it were some kind of essence . 
Although onto--phenomenological description has nowadays become the standard philosophical 
approach to play, there are other theoretical avenues for approaching this topic. In fact, any 
onto-phenomenological description of play may appear rather suspect, precisely because of its 
implicit ahistorical and universal claims, through the so-called phenomenological reduction or 
bracketing, which is itself a play concept. Upon close scrutiny, all these supposedly value-free 
or neutral descriptions may tum out to be historical products of our culture. For instance, I 
shall argue that the contemporary philosophical views of play as am.bivalent and paradoxical may 
simply be the consequences of our established notions of reality and being, deriving from the 
split nature of all Western values. One should therefore consider play not in a universal light 
. . . but in the concrete historical context of our world. 7 
I agree with Spariosu's basic premise : there is no absolute separation between some 
"phenomenon" of play and play-activity . At the same time, this non-distinction is itself not 
absolute, and there is some distinction that can be made between the specific forms of play, 
7Mibai I. Spariosu, Dionysus Reborn : Play and the Aesthetic Dimension in Mod em Philosoph ical and 
Scientific Discours e (Ithaca : Cornell UP, 1989) 3. 
9 
such as particular sports or games, and the human experience of play. As Klaus Meier writes, 
"contrary to any postulations specifying a necessary identification or equation of play and 
games, it is possible for a game, or for that matter a sport (which is a different category 
again), to fulfill all of the requirements of 'gamehood' without demonstrating any play 
characteristics whatsoever. In other words, a game is not invariably, as it is sometimes 
claimed to be, 'the ultimate play form'. On the other hand~ models that attempt to argue for 
major differentiation or even absolute discreteness among the three concepts . . . present their 
own significant conceptual difficulties."8 Play and games should be studied together, but not 
as if they were either inseparable or absolutely different. 
Spariosu contends that play should be understood in its historical context, but this essay 
takes a slightly different approach, trying to understand the concept of play in the context of 
its intellectual and conceptual history, in which the historical paradigm of play is just one 
among many. The influential play theorist Brian Sutton-Smith has recently argued for 
something like the approach I take here, although he uses the term "rhetoric of play'' instead 
of paradigm and chooses to analyze schools of thought different from those I critique. He 
chooses seven rhetorics: "play as progress," "play as fate," "play as identity," "play as the 
imaginary," "the rhetoric of the self," and "play as frivolous ." 9 My own study overlaps his 
in many places, and though we reach very different conclusions about the nature of play, we 
share similar motivations. 
8Klaus V. Meier, "Play and Paradigmatic Integration," The Many Faces of Play (Champaign, Illinois: 
Human Kinetics Publishers, 1983) 277. 
9Brian Sutton-Smith, The Ambiguity of Play (Cambridge: Harvard, 1997) 9-11. 
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Each is called a rhetoric because its ideological values are something that the holders like to 
persuade others to believe in and to live by. Much of the time such values do not even reach a 
level of conscious awareness. People simply take it for granted, for example, that children 
develop as a result of their playing; or that sports are a part of the way in which different states 
and nations compete with each other; or that festivals are a way in which groups are bonded 
together; or that play is a desirable modern form of creativity or personal choice; or that, contrary 
to all of these, play is a waste of time. By seeing how the play descriptions and play theories can 
be tied in with such broad patterns of ideological value, one has greater hope of coming to 
understand the general character of play theory, which is the ultimate objective here.10 
Sutton-Smith ends his study by offering a theory of play; I do the same here, but his is~ in the 
end, biological, while mine is philosophical. The main argument of this paper, after all, is that 
the philosophical paradigm of play gives the most complete understanding of play possible. 
As a final illustration, Paul Weiss describes his own project in these terms: 
A number of philosophic views have shown themselves capable of illuminating important areas, 
some of which have proved to be pertinent to the understanding of major disciplines and 
activities. Treated as doctrines, they are dead, objects to be manipulated and classified in 
textbooks, doing little more than to confuse and bore the young. But if we adopt the spirit which 
generated them, take advantage of proven skills, and apply these in fresh and independent ways 
to specific fields and problems, we will acquire a guidance and perspective we would otherwise 
lack. For some, one type of approach will prove most congenial; for others, one way of 
investigating, dissecting, combining, and organizing will prove most promising or effective. No 
one of us will be equally at home with all; no one of us will be able to use every philosophic 
approach with equal dexterity and profit. But all will gain, if each makes use of what he can, 
with a primary focus on our common subject matter, and then presents it to the rest of us to 
criticize and utilize.11 
The paradigms of human thought which have tried to comprehend play are, as Weiss 
indicates, tools for analysis; in their efforts to illuminate play, their own assumptions and ideas 
10Sutton-Smith 11-12 . 
11Panl Weiss, "Some Philosophical Approaches to Sport," Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 9 (1982) : 
92. 
11 
are exposed . This paper is, like play, a kind of paradox, an articulation of the position that 
true understanding of play cannot be articulated. The intractability of play makes it a perfect 
instrument to bring out the strengths and weaknesses of the thinkers which attempt to 
incorporate it into their intellectual schemes. 
12 
CHAPTER 2: 
A SHORT HISTORY OF PLAY AND ITS PARADIGMS 
There is no way to know the exact age of play, or who the first players were, any more 
- ~ 
than we can date the first joke or the first dream. The archaeological evidence of play is 
practically non-existent before the dawn of the first major settled civilizations in 4000 B.C., 
probably because artifacts associated with play or games cannot easily be classified into the 
conventional archaeological taxonomy of tools, weapons, ritual objects, and so forth. Many 
archaeologists, anthropologists and historians have to rely on speculation and inference in 
their attempts to imagine early human play. We do have some early records> especially of 
games: a Sumerian game board from the royal cemetery in Ur, circa 2600 B.C.; game boards 
from the tomb of the Egyptian Queen Hatasu, c. 1600 B.C.; Homerlan allusions to play and 
games during the Trojan War, c. 550 B.C .; Wei-chi (a Chinese dice game) first mentioned in 
writings from Honan c. 625 B.C.; early Sanskrit writings that discuss some precursors of 
chess (Ashtapada and Shaturanga) c. 800 B.C. 1 Sport has its own body of evidence, mostly 
literary. Egypt has what are probably the oldest records of sports-wrestling, stick fighting, 
water sports, swamp hunting-dating from about five thousand years ago.2 The first list of 
ancient Greek Olympic victors dates from 776 B. C. 3 Some sport and play-objects began as 
1ElliotM. Avedon and Brian Sutton-Smith. The Studyo/Games (New York: Wiley, 1971) 21-22. 




tools and became play-equipment later: skis and snowshoes have been found in Norway, 
Sweden and Siberia that are at least 4,000 to 5,000 years old.4 The participants in almost all 
ancient sports were primarily adults, and only secondarily children. Games, especially ball 
games, were enjoyed by all ages. 
Many (if not most) researchers assume that practically all early play activities, including 
sports, were linked somehow to warfare and religious activities, especially rituals and 
ceremonies. This connection of play with religion and war is used to draw connections 
between the play behavior of such disparate cultures as the Zulus, Aztecs, Eskimos, Apaches 
and the ancient Minoans. Whether this assumption is true or not5, there is much evidence to 
indicate that ,almost all the specific forms and rules of play activities in human cultures 
worldwide emanated from what might be termed religious activity and military training . In 
the West, games and sports were inextricably linked with war and religion until well into early 
modernity .6 It is certain that sports and games, whether coupled to or uncoupled from any 
religious or military context, were spread far and wide through trade, invasion and migration; 
often, the sport or game was without written or even standardized rules. 
Sports and games have been observed and commented on for centuries, but investigations 
of the concept of play are new. Play was oflittle interest to thinkers in the West until the 
nineteenth century, when both Romanticism and the Industrial Revolution transformed the 
face of play. Before those two epochal moments, play was regarded dubiously-necessary 
4William J. Baker, Sports in the Western World, rev , ed . (Urbana: U of Illinois Press , 1988) 6. 
5This paradigm will be analyzed and critiqued in a later chapter as the anthropological paradigm of play. 
6Baker 57-84 . 
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in some sense perhaps, but always with the potential for slipping into excess and vice, like all 
bodily pursuits (the English Puritans of the seventeenth century were extremists in this 
respect, severely curtailing most sports except those associated with royalty-tennis, archery , 
hunting, and some others 7). Even the Greeks and Romans, while praising the masculine 
virtues of sport, often expressed disgust at the violence and brutality of many matches, as well 
as the ever present corruption and "fixed fights. "8 The reason for this ambiguity lies in the 
underpinnings of culture itself Culture, after all, represents an unnatural order, as exemplified 
by the city, set over and against the perceived chaos of uncultured Nature. Play represents 
a combination of freedom (opposed to culture) and order (allied with culture). Every culture 
has shaped this combination of forces to its own ends, whether through religion, organized 
secular sports, games, or other forms of play . The continuing exclusion of women from play 
and especially from sports may be related to this cultural ambiguity : women have an 
ambiguous status to begin with, and are often seen as having the potential for great virtue and 
great vice. Women at play may be too much ambiguity for many members of a culture to take 
(although there are signs that this is changing in the West over the past fifty years) .9 
7
"Theoretically , the Puritan criticism ofrecreation included not only lower-class football , May Day 
games , and animal baiting s, but also upper-class tennis, horse racing , and hunting . In practice , however, the 
Pmitans were more severe in their opposition to public sports that included large numbers of participants than to 
private, individualistic sports and games. Ari stocrats could easily engage in their activities privately ; the pastimes 
of the masses were , of nece ssity, public . Thus the common fo]k felt the heavy hand of Puritan prohibition more 
keenly." Baker 78. 
8Baker 25 , 36-39. 
9The exclusion of women from sport s reveals much about the relationship between play , cultur e, and 
gender. It ' s a topic which , regrettably , I won't be able to addres s as much as I would like , simply because of its 
scope . 
As a side note, it bears mentioning that when women were included in sports , they were treated as novelties and 
freaks to be gawked at. One of the stranger chapters in Roman history , for example , is the prominence offemale 
gladiatorial contests. They took place from the founding of the Colosseum in 69 AD up to the early third century . 
15 
The first great proponent of the developmental paradigm of play was Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, who set forth his ideas about this in Emile, published in 1762. To him, child's play 
was invested "with the charm of freedom. "10 Play was an expression of natural, authentic 
freedom for Rousseau, and was inherently valuable as such. By shifting the semantic valence 
of "play'' away from the negative sense of"diversion, distraction or frivolity" and towards the 
positive sense of"freedom," he permanently changed the Western understanding of play. He 
inspired generations of educators, including Pestalozzi, Froebel and Montessori .11 Rousseau 
was well ahead of his time, however; the Victorians did not immediately take up his 
suggestion that play was something like a natural human right of childhood. When they 
finally did, in the early to mid- nineteenth century, it was partially as a reaction to the 
appalling conditions that urban children lived through during the Industrial Revolution , and 
even then play was often not indulged in for its own sake but for the purpose of self-
improvement. This changed dramatically at the end of the nineteenth century, due to the 
efforts of Thomas Arnold, the master of Rugby School and father of athletic education, and 
his posthumous disciple, Pierre de Coubertin . 
At the end of the nineteenth century, sport was slowly becoming respectable in some 
See Women 's Life in Greece & Rome: A Source Book in Translation, 2nd. ed, eds. Mary R Lefkowitz and 
Maureen B . Fant (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1992) 213-215. 
10Quoted in David Cohen, The Development of Play (New York : New York UP, 1987) 22 . 
11Cohen22 . 
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quarters, but intense hostility still radiated from various camps. In the United States, religious 
denominations in the South were practically unified in their denunciation of such evil pastimes 
as college football and baseball, as William R. Hogan describes . 
In the period 1870-1900 , professional baseball expanded and grew in popularity, and literally 
thousands of amateur teams were also organized. Churchly opposition to professionalism in the 
sport gradually subsided except in the South, where the attack shifted to a denunciation based 
on the rowdy nature of the spectator crowds and on the unquestioned fact that both professionals 
and amateurs played on Sunday . All of the Protestant denominations were opposed to this 
violation of the sanctity of the Sabbath, but there was a difference of opinion as to whether 
baseball on weekdays should be tolerated. The Disciples of Christ and the Southern Baptists 
demonstrated the most extreme animosity. One of the Disciples cried out in 1885: '"Our 
national game,' one of our national curses! Does not every watchman on the wall cry alarm? 
... Speak out. Keep the boys away from it. Don't allow them to become fascinated . with it. 
Trea(it as an enemy.-Base ball playing is apt to lead to Sunday base ball playing .. . My voice 
is against it. Cry with me."12 
Through the influence of Dr. Arnold of Rugby, this attitude of religious disdain for sport was 
eventually transfonned into the modem belief that sport actually helps mold moral character . 
He strongly believed that organized physical activity was a valuable part of education, and his 
students elevated sport to the level of a moral imperative .13 Thomas Hughes' Tom Brown's 
Schooldays and AP. Stanley's The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold made the 
"athletic Christian" association between "games and character, patriotism, moral training, and 
adult duty."14 These works were, in tum, idolized by Pierre de Coubertin, who had a vision 
12Hogan, William R., ''Sin and Sports ," Motivations in Play, Games and Sports , eds. James A Knight 
and R.alp~ Slovenko (Springfield, Ill : Thomas, l 967) 128-129. 
3;,It was not Arnold but his students and their friends who formulated this social philosophy of middle 
class sport." John J. MacAloon, This Great Symbol : Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Olympic Games 




at Arnold's tomb in 1886, after which he began a ''twenty-one year campaign" to bring 
Arnold's ideas to France.15 Coubertin was more successful than he could have hoped, and 
in the twentieth century, the same Southern Christians who denounced football as ''barbaric" 
in the nineteenth century formed the Fellowship of Christian Athletes in 1954. 16 There is a 
social force at work here, as Claudio Veliz has suggested: ''It is possible, with few and heavily 
qualified exceptions, to assert that modern sports are a by-product of an English Industrial 
Revolution that created a need for new community arrangements, a substitute for the 
proximity, the intimacy, and the Gemeinschaft displaced by advancing industrialism." 17 
To return to the history ofideas, Rousseau made little practical headway in the minds of 
the educators of his time. Nevertheless, his fusion of play and freedom was reformulated and 
transformed by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Judgment, published in 1790. In part one 
of that work, "The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," Kant ( who had probably not read Emile) 
writes of the "free play" between the imagination and the work of art as crucial to the process 
of aesthetic experience. Thus he inaugurated the aesthetic paradigm of play, a paradigm 
represented in contemporary times by Hans-Georg Gadamer and others. Years later, yet 
another paradigm was inaugurated, also a transformation of Rousseau's ideas about play and 
freedom: Nietzsche, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (published around 1891 but written much 
earlier), conceives of play as an alternative to reason, a liberating, chaotic force that can free 
~5MacAloon 51. 
"Hogan 139. 
17 Claudio Veliz, The New World of the Gothic Fox: Culture and Economy in English and Spanish 
America (Berkeley: U ofCaliforniaP, 1994) 131. 
18 
us from the dehumanizing confines of logos (much of which he takes from Heraclitus) . This 
paradigm has been extremely influential in modem philosophy, particularly in modem 
Europe, and is currently represented by postmodernists like Jacques Derrida and John 
Caputo. 
Johan Huizinga gave rise to yet another current of thought with his 1946 book Homo 
Ludens. Huizinga's aim in that book was "to try to integrate the concept of play into that of 
culture . Consequently, play is to be understood here not as biological, but as a cultural 
phenomenon. It is approached historically, not scientifically. " 18 His book has become 
influential in many fields, and a cornerstone of the anthropological paradigm of play. He 
marshals a legion of evidence for his thesis that culture and play are necessarily connected, 
which inspired anthropologists and historians to seriously examine play•phenomena . 
Homo Ludens, probably the most influential contemporary work on play, is ambitious in 
its attempts to give both an analysis of play-as~such and a history of play-as-social-fact . 
Huizinga keeps the subjects apart for the sake of clarity, but his understanding of play suffers 
for it. His explication of the nature of play in the first chapter, for example, reaches some 
questionable definitions and conclusions : play is not limited to mankind (although he doesn't 
deal with animal play at all), "play is irrational," "play is the direct opposite of seriousness . "19 
Any observer of a chess game would have to disagree. It makes sense to say that play might 
seem irrational or :frivolous with respect to work or other "serious" cultural pursuits, but 
18Johan Huizinga , Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (Boston: Beacon, 1955) I. 
19Huizinga 3, 4, 5. 
19 
Huizinga's argument is precisely that those pursuits depend on play for their existence-he 
compares play and reason, not play and work. By posing this false dichotomy between the 
rational faculties and fun, he begs the question of exactly what the human experience of play 
is. "Thefim of playing resists all analysis, all logical interpretation . . .. The play concept must 
always remain distinct from all the other forms of thought in which we express the structure 
of mental and social life. Hence we shall have to confine ourselves to describing the main 
characteristics of play. "20 Play~ for Huizinga, seems to be ineffable, and this is where his 
analysis of play-as-such ends. 
Huizinga's weakness comes from his attempt to keep play-as-such and play-as-social-fact 
separate. The history of play, approached in this way, is overwhelmingly long, detailed and 
curiously static. Play-as-such~the physical and mental muscles flexed in play-activity-has 
not really changed from the time the first ball was thrown until now, while the various cultural 
permutations of play (as Huizinga demonstrates eloquently) are numberless. I concentrate 
less on the historical and cultural permutations and more on the conceptions of play which 
have dominated Western thought, with an eye to illuminating play-as-such by comparing, 
contrasting and evaluating those paradigms of play. Huizinga gives himself no avenue for 
2<\-Iuizinga 3, 7. On the other hand, Huizinga does seem to compare play and work in one passage: "Play 
is superfluous. The need for it is only urgent to the extent that the enjoyment of it makes it a need . Play can be 
deferred or suspended at any time . It is never imposed by physical necessity or moral duty. It is never a task . It 
is done at leisure, dwing 'free time. ' Only when play is a recognized cultural function-a rite , a ceremony-is it 
bound up with notions of obligation and duty" (p. 8). While this is consistent with Huizinga's thesis that play 
eludes all attempts to rationalize it into something in the culture rather than something acting on the culture , the 
two statements taken together are confusing. 
20 
investigating play-as-such; he limits himself to describing characteristic manifestations of the 
"play-concept." 
Despite its weaknesses, Homo Ludens contains valuable insights into play. Huizinga 
points out three "main characteristics" of play: it "is free, is in fact freedom", it is "a stepping 
out of'real' life into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all its own," and it has 
"secludedness [and] limitedness. It is 'played out' within certain limits of time and place. It 
contains its own course and meaning. "21 By stressing this last fact, that play "creates order, 
is order," he expresses a truth about play that has gone underappreciated since Rousseau and 
the Romantics' equation of play with freedom. Huizinga appreciates the paradox inherent in 
the fact that play is both very free and very structured, and calls this the "tension" inherent 
in play. 
Tension means uncertainty, chanciness; a striving to decide the issue and so end it. ... It is this 
element of tension and solution that governs all solitary games of skill and application ... and 
the more play bears the character of competition the more fervent it will be .. . . Though play as 
such is outside the realm of good and bad, the element of tension imparts to it a certain ethical 
value in so far as it means a testing of the player's prowess: his courage, tenacity, resources and, 
last but not least, his spiritual powers-his "fairness"; because, despite his ardent desire to win, 
he must still stick to the rules of the game. 22 
He does not claim, as I shall, that the inherent tension in play is connected to the paradoxical 
nature of human beings, but his insight is nonetheless penetrating and accurate. His method 
is more questionable than his conclusions. 
21Huizinga 8-9 . 
22Huizinga 10-11. 
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Huizinga is an appropriate place to begin an evaluative look at conceptions of play. 
It is tempting to call him a representative of the "historical paradigm of play," but he and his 
work truly stand alone, and it doesn't make sense to speak of a paradigm of one. 
Nevertheless, Homo Ludens is a good starting point because of its influence, and also because 
it illustrates something about almost all approaches to play which try to integrate it into their 
discipline: they contain profound truths alongside glaring omissions or misinterpretations. 
This is not necessarily a shortcoming for the discipline itself-most paradigms interpret play 
in such a way that fits their scheme--but for the person interested in gaining insight into play, 
something is missing from these schemes . Such a scheme is the developmental paradigm. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE DEVELOPlefENTAL PARADIGM OF PLAY 
Contradicting a paradigm is maddeningly difficult. If I argue against the paradigm, I am 
obligated to offer a reasonable alternative (unless I want to be purely skeptical); if I argue 
with the paradigm, I take at least some of its assumptions and axioms as part of my argument , 
and thus serve to refine what I want to contradict. The developmental paradigm is legitimate, 
useful, and gives a reasonable, accurate account of human experience within the limits it has 
set for itself Play, however, is a complex, ambiguous human phenomenon that eludes 
confinement within one system of thought. While the developmental paradigm gives a 
description of play which is logical and plausible within its own sphere of analysis, it is too 
limited by its own conception and study of the phenomenon to give a full account-one 
which can suggest the full scope of its internal and external reality, its full meaning for the 
human player. The developmental paradigm belongs to a scientific psychological discipline, 
and embraces the methodology of science. Confronted with the notion of play, 
developmentalists acknowledge that there is more to play than their science can or will allow 
for-but they cannot address the content of that "more" and remain scientists. This is not 
necessarily to find them wanting within their domain, but rather indicates the limits of that 
domain, 
The first step in any scientific endeavor is to make distinctions, and distinctions are one 
of the contributions of developmentalism towards an understanding of play. 
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Developmentalists are quite sensitive to the various types of play which children exhibit, 
though the actual taxonomy varies. Jean Piaget, one of the most influential figures in child 
development, identified three successive stages of play that evolve up to the child's seventh 
year : practice play, symbolic play, and play with rules.1 These stages correspond to his 
understanding of cognitive development: 
According to Piaget, children gain knowledge through the dual processes of assimilation and 
accommodation. In assimilation, children take in information from their experiences in the 
external world-reality. They assimilate--integrate-this information into existing mental 
structures. But their current cognitive structures are often inadequate to incorporate new 
information. They must change or accommodate new mental structures to better accept new 
information that is inconsistent with what they already know. Typically, the opposing forces 
of assimilation and accommodation act in concert to reach a stage of equilibrium. 2 
Against this framework of assimilation and accommodation, Piaget sketches a complex, 
many-staged psychological theory of play. His conclusion: play, by its nature, does not and 
cannot generate novel ways of thinking, or even new thoughts, but is merely representative 
of the child's level of development at that particular moment. "In the act of intelligence 
assimilation and accommodation are constantly synchronized, and consequently in 
equilibrium,'' but in play, "imitative accommodation remains subordinated to assimilation. "3 
He is heavily criticized on this point (as I will show later irt this chapter), and even those who 
1Angeliki Nioolopolou, "Play, Cognitive Development, and the Social World: The Research Perspective," 
Play an d (he Social Context of Development in Early Care and Education, eds. Millie Almy et al (New York: 
Teachers College Press , 1991) 130· 13 I. · 
2Olivia N. Saracho and Bernard Spodek, "Children's Play and Early Childhood Education: Insights From 
History and Theory," Journal of Education 177.3 (1995): 142. 
3Jean Piaget, "The Beginnings of Play," trans. C. Gattegno and F. M. Hodgson, Motivations in Play, 
Games and Sports, eds. Ralph Slovenko and James A. Knight (Springfield; Charles C. Thomas, 1967) 103. 
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followed in his footsteps play essential for development. 4 Nevertheless, his connection of 
play-type with cognition-level remains convincing for many developmentalists. 
Another taxonomy of play, proposed slightly earlier than Piaget's, comes from 
Margaret Lowenfeld, who associates the kind of play to the degree of the player's isolation. 
The first stage of play is "entirely isolated and personal," day-dreaming being the most 
extreme example; the second stage is "still individual, but creates out of the material it uses 
a definite objective play world with which it associates itself;" finally, "playing out with 
fellow-players themes mutually agreed upon.',s Distinctions like Piaget's and Lowenfeld's are 
not as valuable for the actual categories they propose, as much as they are a useful 
recognition of the fact that play is not psychologically monolithic-different players have 
different experiences depending on their level of development. 
Piaget's and Lowenfeld's search for lawful psychological relationships between the playing 
child's mind and the kind of play he or she performs are typical of the approach 
developmentalists have taken. Many theorists study children's play "empirically," by 
examining children's games or sports and cataloging their various manifestations. This 
catalog is often culled into practical guides for parents and educators who want to encourage 
"productive" play. Regardless of the social implications, this kind of empirical observation 
of children's play is useful in that it provides a concrete, definite map of the child's world of 
"Patricia Monighan-Nourot, "The Legacy of Play .in American Early Childhood Education." Children's 
Play and Learning: Perspectives and Policy Implications, eds. Edgar Klugman and Sara Smilansky (New York: 
Teachers College Press , 1990) 77 . 
5Margaret Lowenfeld, Play in Childhood, 1935 (London: MacKeith Press, 1991) 201. 
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play. Games are scientifically useful units of study, unlike the potentially nebulous notion of 
play. This attempt by developmentalists to move toward a scientific, quantifiable framework 
for understanding the ambiguities and peculiarities of play is admirable in motive and 
impressive in execution . 
Developmentalism sheds light on the effects of play on the social, moral, physical and 
mental growth of children, but there are weaknesses in the paradigm-for example, the focus 
on children. Developmentalism takes the child as its subject matter , of course , and 
consequently omits many aspects of the play phenomenon from its theories . It is almost 
impossible, for example, to find developmental literature on play in adolescence , let alone 
adulthood. There are many reasons for this : in modem western culture, socially sanctioned 
adult play is almost exclusively organized sports ; many developmentalists would consider the 
development of adults to be complete, with no growth left to study; and sundry other reasons . 
This narrow focus is perfectly understandable for a scientific discipline with a tightly defined 
conceptual perimeter like developmentalism, but play is not completely contained within that 
perimeter, and the lack of developmental research on adolescent and adult play reflects this 
limitation . 
Another limitation of the deveopmental paradigm is related to its attempt to achieve some 
semblance of scientific rigor. Like other sciences., developmentalist psychology is possessed 
with a passion for nomology , a drive to find lawful relationships between the factors and 
variables involved in a phenomenon ; Piaget's approach to play is a classic example . 
Historians of children' s play and play in general bristle at the suggestion that the human 
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experience of play has remained essentially unchanged; thus, as Emily Cahan, Jay Mechling, 
Brian Sutton-Smith and Sheldon H. White explain, in its inception 
child development was m1derstood as a natural process, an extension of biology, and the general 
goal of research on childhood was to provide benchmarks for parents, teachers, mental 
health workers, and others who dealt with children. Psychological research would establish 
statistical nonns of child development or, ideally, the specifications of universal stages of 
perceptual, cognitive, or moral development. In this view, children are considered to be 
"natural kinds"; they can be understood in terms of timeless, universal laws of development. 
But if childhood is not everywhere and everyplace the same-and the anthropologists and social 
historians have been amply demonstrating to us that it is not-then the meaning and object of 
all forms of psychological research have to be reconsidered. Childhood is a cultural invention. 
The child is a social and historical kind rather than a natural kind. 6 
The nomological drive caused developmentalists to lose sight of the historicity of the child 
and the nature of his play. To be fair to developmentalism, many researchers have recently 
recognized their error and are trying to incorporate conceptions of contingency and change 
into their psychological theories. 7 The process has not been easy on either the 
developmentalists or the historians, both of whom have been forced to rethink their 
assumptions about children and childhood . 
6EmiJy Cahan, Jay Mechling, Brian Sutton-Smith and Sheldon H. White , "The Elusive Historical Child : 
Ways of Knowing the Child of History and Psychology ," Children in Time and Place: Developmental and 
Historical Insights , eds. Glen H. Elder, Jr., et al. (Oxford : Cambridge UP , 1993) 210. 
Piaget, despite his acknowledged influence , has been largely abandoned in the area of play in favor of 
his early contemporary , Lev Vygotsky . While Vygotsky ' s writings are less systematic than Piaget 's, they offer a 
view of play integrated with the child ' s culture , society , and language-i.e. , the child ' s life-world . For criticisms 
of Piaget, see David L. Post, "Piaget 's Theory of Play: A Review of the Critical Literature ," Play: Anthropological 
Perspectives, ed. Michael A Salter (West Point , NY: Leisure Press , 1977) 36-41 ; Vygotsky ' s theories and their 
applications are well-explicated in Elena Bodrova and Deborah J. Leong , Tools of the Mind: The Vygotskian 
Approach to Early Childhood Education (Englewood Cliffs , NJ: Merrill , 1996) . 
For an example of the "new wave" of developmentalism, see Robert S. Siegler, Emerging Minds :The Process 
of Change in Children 's Thinking (Oxford: Oxford UP , 1996).as well as Jaan Valsiner , Culture and the 
Development of Children's Action: A Theory of Human Development, 2nd. ed (New York : Wiley , 1997) . 
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A corollary to the positivism inherent in the developmentalist paradigm is the emphasis on 
functionalism. Play is mainly interesting to the developmentalist in terms of what it is good 
for, and in this they are optimistic about play. This is an excerpt from the beginning of a 
typical contemporary book on the subject of children's play: 
Play is the child's natural way ofleaming; it provides the time and opportunities children need 
to construct their own knowledge. Play poses an appropriate cognitive challenge as children 
use it in shaping social and physical worlds still unpredictable for them . . .. Play is a skill worth 
practicing and mastering-not, as adults often seem to think of it, a mere time filler or 
something to do outside to blow off steam Mastering play is as important as mastering oral 
and written language. All these modes of symbolic representation enable human beings to 
remember, to manage, to plan, and to communicate with each other. 8 (italics added) 
This is an example of the difficult position in which contemporary developmentalists find 
themselves with regards to play. For various reasons-the emphasis on skills in Head Start-
style programs, the reaction against the failure of open classrooms, an awareness of American 
children's international inferiority-play in the school curriculum has been attacked since the 
1970s.9 In order to defend play as a valuable part of schooling, the developmentalists are 
forced to use the terminology of work to describe play, using words like "skill," "practice" 
and "mastery." PatriciaMonigan-Neurot argues that ''the phrases 'play is the child's work' 
and 'children learn through play' have become mere cliches and lost the meaning they carried 
when coined by teachers who were educated to understand the play they saw in their 
8Eliz.abeth Jonesand Gretchen Reynolds, Master Players: Leaming from Children at Play (New York: 
Teachers College Press, 1997) 1. 
9Monigan-Nourot 80. 
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classrooms . "10 But these phrases have a conceptual antecedent in the vocabulary of the 
nineteenth century, when Froebel's kindergartens appealed to industrious Victorian parents 
who wanted their children to accomplish something or better themselves during playtime . By 
positing play itself as a skill, the developmentalists can defend play against accusations that 
it is a "mere time filler." 
The cost ofthis defense is high, however . Play, while certainly contributing to a child's 
cognitive development, is "something to do outside to blow off steam." First, the child does 
not consciously play in order to develop; the development is adjunct with play, not primary 
in relation to it. There seems to be confusion between cause and effect in many 
developmental play theorists on this point. Second, the developmental defenders of play not 
only retreat to the instrumentalist vocabulary of a bygone age in order to shore up their 
rhetorical forces, they attach that rhetoric to a romanticized, idealized vision of play. Brian 
Sutton-Smith , an eminent play theorist, argues: 
Every modem theory of play says that play is of benefit to the player in some way, whether the 
emphasis be on growth, mastery, knowledge, or metacommunication .. . . Yet, as we know from 
animal and human accidents, play is often dysfunctional; and as we know from anthropological 
examples, it is often associated with injury and death. Further . . . much play would not be 
regarded as salutaly by the citizemy. It is a profound paradox that, in this [anthology}, the most 
novel revelations are about illicit play, which is hardly of a socially redeeming character, and yet 
all the authors cling to the advocacy of "play" as something fundamentally good for children.11 
Developmentalism does not address the crueL vicious, rebellious side of childhood play. The 
1
°Monigan-Nourot 80. 
11Brian Sutton-Snilih, "School Play: A Commentary," School Play : A Source Book, eds. James H. Block 
and Nancy King (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1987) 279. 
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practical result for the child is that in a modem American school, play becomes oriented 
towards development. As part of a trend that started, not coincidentally, in the nineteenth 
century, children's play has become, in the words of historian Barbara Finkelstein, 
"sophisticated, commercialized, symbolic, and verbal. As physical violence diminished, the 
number of verbal assaults increased .. .. The playground of 1950 mirrored the commercial 
world of which it was a part-fast-paced, domesticated and free ."12 Finkelstein describes the 
shift in the increasing domestication of children's play using Sutton-Smith's study of New 
Zealand Children: 
Gradually, children came under the control of school authorities and so eventually did their play . 
As they were ordered into schools, children increasingly played in school yards, where teachers 
exercised more and more control over their play lives-first through the introduction of 
gymnastic apparatus and cadet drills, and then, after 1890, through classes in physical education, 
playground games, and organized sports . 13 
After a respite from close supervision from 1890-1920, adult scrutiny resumed: 
From 1920 to 1950, school authorities became increasingly involved in the regulation of 
children's play in school. A reflection of the emergence of "leisure" time as well as more 
indulgent dispositions among "play masters," the introduction of playgro\llld games, organized 
sports, and physical education necessarily involved teachers in the world of children's play. So 
too did the organization of school picnics, garden parties , fancy-dress balls, and the emergence 
of manufactured toys. Takert together, the new curriculum and extracurriculum introduced 
unprecedented amounts of adult supervision into the world of children's play in schools . .. 14 
All of this demonstrates how developmentalism's own interest in the phenomenon of play has 
12Barbara Finkelstein , "Historical Perspectives on Children's Play in School," School Play: A Source 
Book. 24. 
!Zinkelstein 23 . 
.1:'inkelstein 24. 
30 
served to change the kinds of play children engage in. By observing and documenting 
children's play closely, the developmentalists have actually changed their subject matter, much 
like a quantum physicist trying to determine the speed of an electron and thus masking its 
position . 
The limitations of developmentalism have been summed up by William Kessen, himself a 
developmentalist : 
We must be aware of the inherent push to narrowness among developmental psychologists and 
the belief of most of us that anything that can be quantified is automatically better than anything 
that cannot. .. . We have not faced the awesome variety of humankind. Rather, our categories 
serve to limit the variety so that we can control it in our speaking and writing.15 
It is possible that developmentalism, by serving to limit the varieties of play it deems 
legitimate to productive, domesticated, socially acceptable forms of play, has, wittingly or 
not, transformed the landscape of children's play to resemble its romantic vision. 16 Whether 
it has or not, that vision obviously falls short of a complete account of play. 
Developmentalism's insights into the effects of play on the psychology of children are useful 
in their way, but they're only a fragment of the whole story. 
15William Kessen, "A Developmentalist's Reflections ," Children in Time and Place . 
16rbis vision even shows itself in works of conservative , "Great-Tradition " school-reform. Edward A. 
Wynne and Kevin Ryan totally dismiss John Dewey and the progressive-era theorists by labeling their approach 
" learning-is-fun, " i.e. sentimentalist fluff. Instead , they argue , "we should particularly study the learning that 
occurs for members of school athletic teams . .. . T earn practices are often very intense and make little pretense 
oflx;ing fun ." They never question why it is that something as ostensibly playful as sports should be suffused with 
solemnity. See Wynne and Ryan, Reclaiming Our Schools : A Handbook on Teaching Character , A cademics and 
Disc iplin e (Englewood Cliffs , NJ : Merrill , 1993) 47 . 
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE AESfiETIC PARADIGM OF PLAY 
The developmentalist paradigm of play suffers from a limited scope. Its scope is somewhat 
justified by its scientific stance--as a science, it aims for precision and clarity-but that does 
not alter the fact that it falls short for the purposes of giving a full account of play and the 
play experience. One obvious alternative to this restricted approach is a broader definition, 
one that takes into account not only the psychological causes or effects or its value as a 
cognitive exercise, but also incorporates what is essential about play, what gives it its identity. 
This approach is philosophical, not scientific, in its movement away from the concrete 
physicality of "play with respect to children or development" towards the ''thing as such." 
The problem with the philosophical approach is that it runs the risk of being too broad, and 
saying even less about play than the scientific approach. One way of dealing with this danger 
is to approach play phenomenologically, i.e. as it is experienced by the players. This approach 
will be examined later in more detail, but suffice to say that this, too, can fall into confined 
narrowness with regard to play. Another way of avoiding a sweeping philosophical 
misinterpretation of play is to approach it by way of a specific subject, and this is the strategy 
of those thinkers in the aesthetic paradigm of play. These thinkers, mainly philosophers, use 
play in their aesthetic theories to illuminate aspects of art and its relationship to the mind or 
the observer; in an indirect way, this illumination is meant to reflect back upon play and shed 
light on it. While these thinkers attempt to ground their understanding of play finnly within 
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their aesthetics, they insist that play retains enough generality to survive as an autonomous 
concept when extrapolated from their theories-a narrow path to tread . 
Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Judgment, treads fearlessly. Kant's aesthetic theory in 
his Critique is complicated, so I offer a simplified version here. Donald W. Crawford gives 
a useful summary of how Kant describes the aesthetic experience: 
(1) The pleasure on which the judgment of taste is based must be grounded in a universally 
communicable mental state. 
(2) A representation can be objective and can have a universal point of reference with 
which evexyone' s faculty of representation is compelled to harmonize only insofar as it belongs 
to cognition. 
(3) Nothing can be universally communicated except cognition and representations, insofar 
as they belong to cognition. 
( 4) The determining ground of the judgment for this universal communicability of the 
representation [that is, the judgment of taste] is merely subjective, that is, it is conceived without 
any concept of the object. 
(5) The determining ground of the judgment for the universal communicability of the 
representation [the universally communicable mental state] can be nothing else but the mental 
state found in the relation of representations to one another insofar as they relate a given 
representation to cognition in general. 
(6) The powers required to turn a representation by which an object is given into knowledge 
(cognition) are imagination (to gather together the perceptual manifold) and understanding (to 
synthesize the representation into the unity of the conc:ept). 
(7) The universally communicable mental state in the judgment of taste must be one of 
feeling the free play of the powers of representation (that is, the imagination and the 
understanding) when a given representation is generally suited for cognition [that is, not leading 
to a definite concept]. 
(8) This state [that is, the mental state or the feeling] of free play of the cognitive faculties 
in a representation by which an object is given must be universally communicable, because 
cognition is the only kind of representation which is valid for everyone.1 
When we use our faculties to cognize something that is generally cognizable (as opposed to 
something that focuses that mind towards a definite, specific concept) there is an interaction 
1Donald W. Crawford, Kant's Aesthetic Theory (London: U of Wisconsin P, 1974) 76-77. The italics 
are mine, and are meant to provide some useful emphases. 
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between imagination and understanding which Kant describes as "free play." This kind of 
"play'' ( or "Spiel") is used in a general sense by Kant to describe forces in motion, and does 
not mean play-activity in the conventional English sense (although the German "Spiel" can 
mean "game"). The "freedom" of the free play is explained well by Mary McCloskey : 
The imagination is free because it is not 'at the service of the understanding and understanding 
is free because [it is] not under the constraints of ascertaining truth or solving problems of 
practice. The imagination can, as it were, take the understanding for a walk. The understanding 
can come along because freed from its usual constraints its role is simply to keep the 
imagination's synthesizings thinkable . The interaction of both is described as a mutual 
'quickening' .2 
Kant claims that this quickening is the source of aesthetic pleasure: "This merely subjective 
(aesthetic) judging of the object, or of the presentation by which it is given, precedes the 
pleasure in the object and is the basis of this pleasure, [ a pleasure] in the harmony of the 
cognitive powers."3 For Kant, the pleasure we get from art is based on an internal interplay, 
felt as pleasure. The importance of this quickening doesn't end in subjective feeling, 
however. Kant argues that we expect a certain amount of objective agreement with our own 
jugments of taste, based on the notion that others must experience this quickening in the same 
situations as us. "When we make a judgment of taste, the pleasure we feel is something we 
require from everyone else as necessary, just as if, when we call something beautiful, we had 
to regard beauty as a characteristic of the object, determined in it according to concepts, even 
2Mary A. McCloskey , Kant 's A esthetic (New York: SUNY Press , 1987) 70-71. 
3:Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment , trans . Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987) 62 . Page 
numbers refer to the pages of the Hackett edition, not the original Akademie edition. 
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though in fact, apart from a reference to the subject's feeling, beauty is nothing by itself.''4 
The pleasure that results from the internal "free play" helps to build what Kant calls a sensus 
communis, a "common sense" community of shared aesthetic judgment; thus the subjectivity 
of personal pleasure leads to the objectivity of the sensus communis. As Salim Kemal puts 
it, 'We may not only impute this experience [the free play of faculties] to all other subjects 
on the basis of supposing that they share the common sense which makes for that state of 
mind, and so suppose it universally valid for all subjects, but also may go on to demand of 
other such subjects that they assent to the judgment of taste by gaining the same pleasurable 
state of mind for themselves. "5 
The link between Kant's aesthetic theory and his view of play is pleasure. In his 
aesthetics, "any changing free play of sensations (that are not based on an intention) gratifies 
us, because it furthers our feeling of health, and it does not matter whether in our rational 
judgment we like the object of this play [quickening], or like this gratification itself',6 In his 
analysis of play, Kant still evades the question of what play is, but he places the pleasure 
associated with it squarely at the root of certain kinds of irrational gratification associated 
with a "feeling of health." Kant provides a typology of this Jc.ind of play: 
We may divide such play into the play [ or game] of chance, the play of tones [in music], and 
the play of thought [or of wit]. The.first of these requires an interest, whether in vanity or in 
our own profit .. . . The play of tones requires merely a change of sensations, each of which 
relates to affect, but without having the strength [Grad] of an affect, and arouses aesthetic ideas. 
4:Kant 62-63. 
5Salim Kem.al, Kant's Aesthetic Theory: An Introduction (New York: St. Martin's Press , 1992) 68. 
6:Kant 202. 
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The play of thought arises merely from the change of presentations in judgment; although it 
produces no thought that carries any interest with it, it does quicken the mind. 7 
Kant dwells on play which leads to irrational gratification because he assumes that play and 
reason are sharply separate. 8 Kant does not necessarily have a high opinion of this kind of 
play, an attitude implied in his statement that we may not "like the gratification itself," an 
allusion, to "guilty pleasures," or even pleasurable experiences which are beyond our 
control-sexual response, for example. Also, he refuses to give anything like a general 
definition of play; instead, he names certain situations as playful and goes on to describe the 
situations. 
Kant's ambivalence towards play becomes clear as he proceeds. 
How gratifying such play must be, without our having to assume an underlying interested 
intention, is shown by all our evening parties ; for without play almost none of them could keep 
itself entertained . But many affects are at play there,-hope, fear, joy , anger, and scorn, 
alternating constantly-and are so lively that they amount to an inner motion that seems to 
further all the vital processes in the body, as is proved by how sprightly the mind becomes as a 
result, even though nothing has been won or learned.9 
Kant relegates this kind of play to "entertainment" and gives it no cognitive value at all, It 
bears reminding that all these pursuits-games of chance, music, wit and word-games-are 
activities which contemporary educators use to teach children basic concepts, and are 
considered perfectly respectable tools of thought. Kant is clearly not a developmentalist, 
7Kant202. 
8Mihai I. Spariosu explicates this well in Dionysus Reborn (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989) 33~53. 
9.Kant 202 . 
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though he does assign some positive social (if not cognitive) value to entertainment. 
As he continues to analyze play, however, he also makes interesting physiological 
speculations. He dismisses games of chance as not worth discussing: "Since the play of 
chance is not beautiful play, we shall here set it aside." On the other hand, "music and 
something to laugh about are two kinds of play with aesthetic ideas, or for that matter with 
presentations of the understanding, by which in the end nothing is thought; it is merely the 
change they involve that still enables them to gratify us in a lively way." In other words, this 
play is a physical phenomenon which lacks the intellectual aspect of an aesthetic experience . 
This shows rather clearly that in both of them the quickening is merely bodily , even though it 
is aroused by ideas of the mind, and shows that all the gratification [we find] at a lively party, 
extolled as being so refined and inspired, consists [merely] in the feeling of health that is 
produced by an intestational agitatio,n corresponding to such play. It is not our judging of the 
harmony we find in tones or in flashes of wit ... but the furtherance of the vital processes in the 
body, the affect that agitates the intestines and the diaphragm, in a word the feeling of health 
(which we cannot feel without such prompting}, which constitutes the gratification we find in 
the fact that we can reach the body through the soul as well, and use the soul as the physician 
of the body. 10 
The mind, to a certain extent, gives rise to play but is not affected by it, and the effects of play 
can be reduced to a "merely bodily'' event. Apart from the free play of the understanding and 
imagination involved in cognizing the aesthetic , play which is not ''based on intentions" is 
simply an "intestinal agitation," which has its place, but not much value apart from its role at 
parties . Perhaps Kant is not as derisive as he sounds; perhaps this tone is an accident of 
1
°Kant 202-203. My italics. Unfortunately, space prevents me from going deeper into Kant ' s fascinating 
investigation of laughter, but that 's another essay altogether. 
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translation and he really means to respect this kind of play in its role, but I doubt it. Even in 
his remark that we get gratification from the fact that we can ''use the soul as the physician 
of the body" seems ambiguous, insofar as the body (in that statement) is something that needs 
healing and this kind of play is "merely bodily." 
Kant's attempt to reduce these forms of play to a physiological phenomenon is a 
distortion, but Kant does stress an important aspect of play: it is a process of different aspects 
or faculties of the mind or soul coming together to produce a unique sensation. Whether that 
sensation has any cognitive content is a different question, but the basic point remains. The 
developmentalists elucidate the ways play exercises one's cognitive and social skills, but they 
offer no description of the content of the play experience for the player ( as opposed to a 
psychological or cognitive reduction of play that doesn't address the player's own conscious 
experience). Unfortunately, Kant doesn't go very far in his own description; he may have 
begged off because of his conviction that the pleasure at the core of play is irrational and thus 
not amenable to rational philosophical inquiry . Whatever the reason, the question of what 
play is like for the player remains open . 
That open question is addressed by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his own theories of 
aesthetics, as he explains them in Truth and Method and various essays. Like Kant, he 
approaches play via aesthetics . His examination of play comes out of an inquiry into "the 
mode of being of the work of art itse/f."11 Unlike Kant, however, he wants to ''free this 
11Hans-Georg Gadamer , Truth and Method, 2nd . rev. ed., rev. trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G . 
Marshall (New Yorlc Continuum , 1994) l 00. His italics. 
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concept [play] of the subjective meaning that it has in Kant and Schiller and that dominates 
the whole of modem aesthetics and the philosophy ofman ."12 He makes it clear that he wants 
to shift the focus away from the player and onto play-as-such . He compares the experience 
(or rather , non-experience) of play with what he calls ~'the leveling process of aesthetic 
consciousness ": 
The work of art is not an object that stands over against a subject for itself. Instead the work 
of art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an experience that changes the person who 
experiences it. The "subject" of the experience of art, that which remains and endures, is not 
the subjectivity of the person who experiences it but the work itself This is the point at 
which the mode of being of play becomes significant. For play has its own essence, 
independent of the consciousness of those who play. Play-indeed , play proper-also exists 
when the thematic horizon is not limited by any being-for-itself of subjectivity, and where 
there are no subjects who are behaving "playfully."13 
he denies the playing subject any significance in understanding play-as-such . ''The players are 
not the subjects of play; instead play merely reaches presentation (Darstellung) through the 
players . .. . It is the game that is played-it is irrelevant whether or not there is a subject who 
plays it. "14 
Ga.darner's insistence on the irrelevance of the players for play seems bizarre until he 
explains his usage of the word play (as in Kant, "Spiel"). "If we examine how the word 'play' 
is used and concentrate on its so-called metaphorical senses, we find talk of the play of light, 
the play of the waves, the play of gears or parts of machinery, the interplay of limbs, the play 
12Gadamer Truth IO l. 
13Gadamer Truth l 02 . 
14Gadamer Truth l 02. 
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of forces, the play of gnats, even a play on words.,' 15 His strategy in ignoring the important 
role of the player then becomes obvious: ''In each case what is intended is to-and-fro 
movement that is not tied to any goal that would bring it to an end . Hence . . . the primordial 
sense of playing is the medial one .... The being of the work of art is connected with the 
medial sense of play (Spiel: also, game and drama)." 16 He moves from art to play and back 
to art again; thus he needs to use a narrow interpretation of play as a way of illustrating his 
own aesthetic theory . 
In order to make the relation of play to art more explicit, Gadamer continues in this vein, 
finally arriving at the crucial point: ''Play is really limited to presenting itself Thus its mode 
of being is a self-presentation .... The self-presentation of the game involves the player's 
achieving, as it were, his own self-presentation by playing-i.e ., presenting-something .. . 
. The player experiences the game as a reality that surpasses him. This is all the more the case 
where the game is itself 'intended' as such a reality-for instance, the play which appears as 
presentation for an audience."17 The spectator is the figure who is indispensable to play, not 
the player, who is merely incidental . It is the spectator, "not the player [who] is the person 
for and in whom the play is played. " 18 This claim of his might make more sense if he argued 
that the spectator, not the player, had the authentic play experience, but he doesn't believe 
15Gadamer Truth 103. 
16Gadamer Truth 103, 105. Gadamer's sense of "medial" is rooted in his assertion that "the fact of the 
being of the work itself' takes ontological priority over the being of the artist or creator "for himself,", the 
performer "for himself', or the spectator "for himself' (128) . Thus art and play act to "mediate" between one's 
being-in-the-world and one's being-for-oneself by imposing their own being in between. 
17Gadamer Truth 108, 109. 
18Gadamer Truth 110. 
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in the play experience at all; play is an action, "an expression of a play-drive,"19 but is not 
really present to the player in any meaningful way that can be called an experience. 
Finally, Gadamer explains the significance of play with respect to his aesthetics . ''My 
thesis, then, is that the being of art . . . is a part of the event of being that occurs in 
presentation, and belongs essentially to play as play."20 Play as play is total mediation, and 
total involvement: "The concept of play was introduced precisely to show that everyone 
involved in play is a participant [thus, total involvement]. It should also be true of the play 
of art that there is in principle no radical separation between the work of art and the person 
who experiences it [ thus, total mediation]. "21 Even though Gadamer has argued that the 
player's experience of play is not important or significant to the understanding of play, 
Gadamer does describe the content of the aesthetic experience. 
The spectator is set at an absolute distance, a distance that precludes practical or goal-oriented 
participation. But this distance is aesthetic distance in a true sense, for it signifies the distance 
necessary for seeing that thus makes possible a genuine and comprehensive participation in what 
is present.ed before us. A spectator's ecstatic self-forgetfulness corresponds to his community 
with himself Precisely that in which one loses oneself as a spectator demands that one grasp 
the continuity of meaning. For it is the truth of our own world ... that is presented before us 
and in which we recognize ourselves . . . . The absolute moment in which a spectator stands is 
both one of self-forgetfulness and of mediation with himself. What rends him from himself at 
the same time gives him back the whole of his being. 22 
The spectator undergoes a disintegration and reintegration (as does the work itself, in the 
19Gadamer, "The Play of Art," The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, trans. Nicholas Walker, 
ed. intro. Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986) 126. 
20Gadamer Truth 116. 
21Gadamer, "The Relevance of the Beautiful." The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays. 28. 
22Gadamer Truth 128. My italics 
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process of interpretation) that occurs essentially in time-a moment of giving followed by a 
moment ofreceiving. Gadamer's description of the aesthetic experience would make perfect 
sense if applied to play. The player's experience could be described as a moment of self-
forgetfulness, entering the play-activity, followed by a moment of recovery of one's 
wholeness, returning from the play-activity and back to normalcy . The fact that he does not 
do this, insisting instead on the primacy of the spectator over the participant, makes sense for 
his aesthetic theory but not for any understanding of play. 23 
In bis attempt to shift the focus of play away from subjectivity, Gadamer loses his grip on 
the fundamental question of the content of the play-experience for the player. He does offer 
a kind of analysis in his concept of the rei.I'ltegrative aesthetic experience, an experience which 
could be attibuted to both the specatator and the participant in play. Unfortunately, he stops 
short of a thorough investigation of this reintegrative aesthetic/play experience. Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi and Rick E. Robinson offer a more detailed description of the aesthetic 
experience in their study of the actual aesthetic experiences of various individuals, The Art 
of Seeing. They conclude that the roots of an aesthetic experience lie in what they call 
"flow": 
The aesthetic experience can be taken as one form of flow, or optimal experience, related to 
many similar experiences that share the same structural attributes-deep concentration, a sense 
of control and freedom made possible by a balancing of challenges and skills, and a continuous 
development of meaningful complexity-experiences that follow inunersion in religious rituals, 
23°paul Crowther contends that "Gadamer' s introduction of the 'play' analogy is entirely gratuitous," and 
that "no attempt is made to explain why this analogy is particularly appropiate to art, and why it is more 
appropriate than other models." Art and Embodiment: From Aesthetics to Self-Consciousness (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1993) 36. 
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in athletic competition, or in the performance of music or playing chess . . .. 24 
What exactly is this "optimal experience" like? Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson describe it 
thus : 
Merging of Action and Awareness: Attention centered on activity. 
Limitation of Stin1ulus Field: No awareness of past and future. 
Loss of Ego: Loss of self-consciousness and transcendence of ego boundaries. 
Control of Actions: Skills adequate to overcome challenges. 
Clear Goals, Clear Feedback. 
Autotelic N~ture: Does not need external awards, intrinsically satisfying.25 
These descriptive categories echo the developmental paradigm in their psychological 
language, but this isn't a bad thing in itself "Flow" seems to account for many aspects of 
the play experience that Kant's model of play as pleasure cannot. The drawback of the 
various characteristics of flow is their generality; Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson want to 
establish a family of flow experiences sharing "structural attributes," which puts the 
uniqueness of each experience in question. It's not unthinkable that play should be compared 
with other experiences in order to understand it better, but then why get to play via aesthetics 
if the detour isn't necessaty?26 
~ Csikszen1mihalyi and Rick E. Robinson, The Art of Seeing : An Interpretation of the Aesthetic 
Encountef (Malibu: Getty Museum and Getty Center for Education in the Arts, 1990) 182. 
5C~ilcsz.entmiha¥. ~ llo~inson. 8. . . . . . 26Csikszentmibalyi himself disowns any relanOI1Sbip between his researoh mto the "flow" ex:penence and 
play, asserting that "neither flow nor playfulness should be confused with play forms or play behavior." "Some 
Paradoxes in the Definition of Play," Play as Context, ed. A. T. Cheska (West Point, NY: Leisure Press, 1981) 25. 
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Gadamer, Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson give convincing clues to the subjective content 
of the play experience for the player, and Kant tries to explain what aspects of the human 
being make the play experience possible . This is the right direction, but the aesthetic 
paradigm of play is hamstrung for the same reason as the developmental paradigm : its focus 
is too narrow. When aesthetics widens its view, as in Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson, then 
aesthetics as such seems incidental, only valuable as a similar phenomenon to compare to 
play, not a scheme essential to the illumination of play. The aesthetic paradigm, just like the 
developmental paradigm, is too limited to describe the life of play. 




THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL PARADIGM OF PLAY 
Historians of play try to describe play by analyzing its past, developmentalists try to reduce 
play to its psychological elements, and aesthetic theorists try to show the structure and 
content of play by way of its role in art and creativity . All these thinkers approach play from 
a specific standpoint and investigate it using their particular schematic strategies, and all of 
them falter when they try to provide a deeper understanding of play than their discipline will 
allow. Another paradigm whose members try to incorporate play into their scheme is 
anthropology. They also pose questions unique to their intellectual scope, and they also fall 
short of a full account of play. 
Within the anthropological study of play, Alyce Taylor Cheska discerns five approaches 
in its history. These are not exhaustive, but they are a useful starting point . They are 
antiquarianism, evolutionism, diffusionism, functionalism, and structuralism. 1 Antiquarianism 
is simply the study of the historical records made by "captives, missionaries, entrepreneurs, 
administrators, teachers, and travelers" 2 concerning the various play activities of the people 
they observed. This historical approach has already been discussed in chapter two. 
Evolutionism tries to account for play by looking for significant origins in play and culture. 
The "general postulates" of this approach are: "1) culture has developed through stages in a 
1Alyce Taylor Cheska, "The Study of Play from Five Anthropological Perspectives," Play: 
Anthropojogical Perspectives, ed. Michael A. Salter (West Point, NY : Leisure Press, 1977) 17. 
Cheska 17. 
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predetermined, uniform way; 2) culture evolved from the simple to the complex; 3) 
similarities among different societies [are] explained by the 'psychic unity' of man which 
accounted for parallel development and independent invention . "3 This approach first became 
popular in the late l 800's due to the efforts of Edward B. Taylor and his followers, and 
reappeared in a different form in the mid• l 900's . The evolutionist approach even became 
linked with the developmental paradigm when G.S. Hall and Mabel Reany, in the early 19001s, 
proposed parallels between children's play-stages and stages in the development of cultures; 
now, developmentalism mostly finds sympathy with functionalists . The diffusionist approach 
holds that "l) independent invention was rare (British school); 2) culture traits diffused from 
a geographical center outward (German-Austrian Kulturkreis school); and 3) culture traits 
diffused over wide geographical areas (American school).',4 Diffusionism concentrate on 
cross-cultural studies of specific game forms in an attempt to arrive at some understanding 
of how various cultures interacted with each other. These three approaches-antiquarianism, 
evolutionism, and diffusionism-have in common a great reliance on comparative folklore. 
Brian Sutton-Smith criticizes these approaches by pointing out their tendency to use play 
as a tool for better understanding the mechanisms of cultural development or diffusion, in 
other words as a means, not an end . 
All these esteemed scholars were not really concerned with play and games, they were concerned 
with other more important and serious subject-matters, such as diffusion. They were neglecting 




granted, they in effect always study text without also studying context. So we never really do 
know how or what these plays mean to those that use them. We have the record or play and 
games they provide, but little insight into what they mean to the players. 5 
This glossing over of the meaning of play for the player is a common thread running through 
the various paradigms. 
Another anthropological approach, which attempts to get at play a different way, is 
functionalism. The functional approach, as Cheska describes, holds that: "l) each culture is 
to be treated as a functionally interrelated system; 2) social behavior exists to maintain 
society's social structure; 3) a society is the total network of social relationships; 4) cultural 
traits are useful parts of the society in which they occur; and 5) a cultural trait's function is 
to satisfy some basic and/or derived need of the individuals in a society."6 The functionalist 
approach, when applied to play, purports play's function to be "role practice, remediation, 
integration, maintenance, and potentiation . "7 While it is natural enough to say that "games 
do not exist randomly in the structural fabric [but are] there for a cultural purpose," 8 whether 
that purpose is integrative or innovative is not clear. Functionalism decidedly favors play's 
integrative function, but "how play may provide mechanisms for expressing conflict and 
5Brian Sutton-Smith, ''Towards an Anthropology of Play," Studies in the Anthropology of Play: Papers 





change has increasingly become the subject of play theorists' attention ."9 
Finally, structuralism's key concepts are: "l) structure is an ordered arrangement of parts 
or components; 2) social structure is manifest in the functioning of elements as a system; 3) 
these elements or particular features are parts of an organized whole . "10 There is also the 
brand of structuralism associated with Claude Levi-Strauss, which argues thus: "In comparing 
the structure of social games and ritual games, (Levi-Strauss] perceived that in the former, 
the pre-game symmetry of participants is rendered asymmetrical by taking part in the structure 
or rules of the event in relation to the participants' will, chance or skill. In ritual games, the 
pre~event asymmetry of participants is structurally changed by participation in the event, 
rendering each symmetrical or equal in condition. "11 In its emphasis on symmetry and 
structured wholes, structuralism is close to functionalism in its analysis of play. Both attempt 
to analyze how the players of a culture use their play to create and resolve various kinds of 
social tension within their communities. 
The assumption that play' s main social purpose is to release tension is a recurring theme 
in anthropology . Kendall Blanchard, for instance, asserts that "play is a mechanism that 
human beings employ to remove themselves from the angst of reflecting on the realities of 
existence . Play is a symbolic distancing that relieves or at least limits that tension. "12 This 
assertion has truth to it, but gives a incomplete picture. Sutton-Smith points out that "any 
~fheska23. 
11Cheska24 . Cheska25 . 
12Kendall Blanchard, "Play as Adaptation: The Work-Play Dichotomy Revisited," Cultural Dimensions 
of Play, Games and Sport, ed. Beynard M~gen (Champaign, Illinois : Human Kinetics Publishers, 1989) 81. 
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anthropology of play is in danger of succumbing to integrative theories because anthropology 
has tended to deal with relatively static societies . Perhaps in a complex culture such as our 
own we might be in danger of paying too much attention to novelty, although this is hardly 
to be feared as yet. The nom1ative view of culture is still too strong with us. "13 Sutton-Smith 
himself outlines the structure of a research program which would attempt to account for 
play's many facets. 
We need an account which focuses on all the issues of both text and context . . .. Let me deal first 
and most briefly with text. Here I have found it useful to think of playing cognitively as a form 
of abstraction. By this I mean a novel formulative process by which the child creates meaning 
and organization out of his prior experience, following here Vygotsky's interpretatio11 rather than 
Piaget's. Conatively, I believe it is best thought of as a form of power reversal. Affectively, as 
a form of vivification of experience. 
The antecedent context can emphasize the relationship prior to exploratory activity, as does 
Piaget, to antecedent power relationships or to antecedent signal activity, following Bateson. 
It can stress the nature of stimulus, motivational and affective quiescence as necessary for play. 
Or it can emphasize the paradoxical carry over of long-term enduring motives and conflicts into 
the play itself. . . . 
The postcedent context includes the novelty to which play as abstractions give rise, the 
flexibility which is an outcome of the power reversals, and the sense of revival which comes 
from the special quality of vivifying affective experience in play.14 
Despite his obfuscating language in this passage, S1,.1tton-Smith's desire is simple: he wants 
anthropologists to focus on 'lhe innovative functions of playing and try to account for the 
ways in which novelties introduced into the text ultimately transfer back to the society at 
large. " 15 This is a laudable project, and seems simple enough at first glance. The program 
13Sutton-Smith 231 . 
14Sutton-Smith 230-23 L His italics , 
15Sutton-Smith 23 L His italics . 
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which he proposes, however, is complicated, vague, and not a useful outline for research . 16 
Nevertheless, some have tried to use the '<text" and "context" idea as a model for their own 
anthropological investigations of play. Clifford Geertz, for example, echoes Sutton-Smith in 
his analysis of culture as an "acted document" 17 (to be interpreted, in many ways, like a text) 
in his influential essays on religious rituals and cockfighting in Bali. For Geertz, play is rooted 
in ritual and other types of cultural "performance." 
Geertz's description of the Rangda-Barong religious performance in Bali resembles 
Gadamer's description of the '<total mediation" and '<total involvement" of art and play. The 
Rangda-Barong performance concerns "a terrible witch called Rangda" who "engages in a 
ritual combat with an endearing monster called Barong ." 
For our purposes, the main point to be stressed is that the drama is, for the Balinese, not merely 
a spectacle to be watched but a ritual to be enacted. There is no aesthetic distance here 
separating actors from audience and placing the depicted events in an unenterable world of 
illusion, and by the time a full-scale Rangda-Barong encounter has been concluded a majority, 
often nearly all, of the members of the group sponsoring it will have become caught up in it not 
just imaginatively but bodily .... Thirty to forty participants is in no way unusual.18 
Just as, for Gadamer, the being of the play-activity or the work of art interposed itself 
between the observer and his own being, the being of the Rangda-Barong ritual performance 
interposes itself into the being of the Balinese participants, resulting in "a spectator's ecstatic 
16 Sutton-Smith has, since the article quoted was written, given up his attempts at an anthropological 
theory of play and has become vecy skeptical of academic attempts to explain play . His recent work is similar to 
this essay , as I point out in the last chapter . 
17Cliftbrd Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: BasicBooks, 1973) 10. Also : "The culture 
of a people is an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles, which the anthropologist strains to read over the 
shoulders if those to whom they properly belong" (452). 
1 Geertz 116, 
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self-forgetfulness" 19 as they go into trances or run amok. As Geertz puts it: 
It is in the direct encounter with the two figures in the context of the actual performance that the 
villager comes to know them as, so far as he is concerned, genuine realities. They are, then, not 
representations of anything, but presences. And when the villagers go into trance they 
become--nadt- themselves part of the realm in which those presences exist. 20 
Gadamer's description of the aesthetic experience (or non-experience of play) is similar to 
Geertz's description of the ritual participant's experience . 
For both Geertz and Gadamer, the ultimate effect of the experience is a reintegration into 
a deep sense of meaning, a conservative relocation of oneself in some context, some telos, 
some system. Gadamer claims that "a spectator's ecstatic self-forgetfulness corresponds to 
his community with himself Precisely that in which one loses oneself as a spectator demands 
that one grasp the continuity of meaning. For it is the troth of our own world . . . that is 
presented before us and in which we recognize ourselves. . . . The absolute moment in which 
a spectator stands is both one of self-forgetfulness and of mediation with himself What rends 
him from himself at the same time gives him back the whole of his being. "21 
Compare that statment of Gadamer's with Geertz's: "The constantly recurring struggle 
of Rangda and Barong to an inevitable draw is thus--for the believing Balinese-both the 
formulation of a general religious conception and the authoritative experience which justifies, 
even compels, its acceptance . "22 In both cases, the experience functions to place the 
~~Gadamer, Troth and Method, 128. 
Geertz 118. 
2
~Gada.mer Troth 128. My emphasis. 
2 Geertz 118. My emphasis. 
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individual firmly within a framework of meaning which serves to define truth for that 
individual. Gadamer ignores the possibility of an aesthetic experience which acts as a 
discontinuity, compelling the individual to reevaluate the meaning structures that surround 
him or her; Geertz refuses to consider that ritual or play might act as a catalyst for what 
Durkheim calls "collective effervescencet a dynamic force for change in society or a kind of 
resistance to oppression . 23 
The consequences of this integrationist view, which Sutton-Smith warns against, become 
clear when Geertz addresses the topic of play directly in his essay "Deep Play: Notes on the 
Balinese Cockfight." He borrows the notion of''deep play'' from Jeremy Bentham: "By it he 
means play in which the stakes are so high that it is, from his utilitarian standpoint, irrational 
for men to engage in it at all . . . . But for the Balinese . . . the explanation lies [not in their 
irrationality but] in the fact that in such play, money is less a measure of utility, had or 
expected, than it is a symbol of moral import, perceived or imposed .... In deep [games]; 
where the amounts of money are great, much more is at stake than material gain: namely, 
esteem, honor, dignity, respect-in a word, although in Bali a profoundly weighted word, 
status. It is at stake symbolically, for .. . no one's status is actually altered by the outcome 
of a cockfight . . . . "24 In his interpretation of the cockfight, the game has no power other 
than representation, where at least the ritual has the power effect some kind of personal 
23George Eisen, describing children's play at various times and places during the Holocaµst, contends 
that "it would not be inflating the concept of opposition to claim that children turned their play and games into a 
form of protest and a form of defiance, on both the subconscious and the conscious levels ." Children and Play 
in the Holocaust: Games Among the Shadows (Amherst, MA: U of Massachusetts P, 1988) 84. 
24Geertz 432-433 . 
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transformation , however fleeting . 
Like any art form-for that, finally, is what we are dealing with-the cockfight renders ordinary, 
eveiyday experience comprehensible by presenting it in tenns of acts and objects which have had 
their practical consequences removed and been reduced (or, if you prefer, raised) to the level of 
sheer appearances, where their meaning can be more powerfully articulated and more exactly 
perceived. The cockfight is "really real" only to the cocks . . . . What it does is what . . . Lear 
and Crime and Punishment do; it catches up these themes-death , masculinity, rage, pride, loss, 
beneficence, chance-and, ordering them into an encompassing structure, presents them in such 
a way as to throw into relief a particular view of their essential nature. It puts a construction on 
them, makes them .. . meaningful-visible, tangible, graspable- "real," in an ideational sense. 
An image, fiction, a modeL a metaphor, the cockfight is a means of expression; its function is 
neither to assuage social passions nor to heighten them [but] ... to display them. 25 
The point of this lengthy comparison of Geertz to Gadamer is to show that both fail to 
give a full account of play, especially the experience of play, for similar reasons. Gadamer 
insists on investigating play through the its relation to aesthetic experience. Geertz insists on 
interpreting play's cultural purpose by analyzing its function of self-conscious articulation . 
Neither of them acknowledge the sheer power of play, whether play-as-art or play-as-ritual. 
Geertz, for example, claims that the Balinese -cockfight would have no power to captivate or 
motivate the Balinese ifit did not act as a force for articulation . and that it is not "really real" 
to the human participants. This claim is based on his assumption that a symbolic system 
ontologically trumps practice and action. As Talal Asad points out in his criticism of Geertz, 
"discourse involved in practice is not the same as that involved in speaking about practice . 
It is a modem idea that a practitioner cannot know how to live religiously without being able 
25Geertz 443-444 . 
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to articulate that knowledge ."26 In terms of play, Geertz's model assumes that the game's 
importance stems from the fact that it is "an image, fiction, a model, a metaphor . . . a means 
of expression," and not an actual, physical activity which the participants experience . Geertz 
takes Sutton-Smith ' s injunction to consider text and context too literally: the cockfight, for 
Geertz, is no longer a lived reality but a text to be interpreted and reinterpreted by native and 
anthropologist alike. 
A more accurate view of the link between play and ritual is taken by Victor Turner. He 
introduces Arnold van Gennep' s concept of "liminality" in rites of passage, which are "the 
passage [ of an initiand or ritual participant] from one social status to another. ,m 
The novices are, in fact, temporarily undefined, beyond the nonnative social structure. This 
weakens them, since they have no rights over others. But it also liberates them from structural 
obligations. It places them too in a closer connection with non-social or asocial powers of life 
or death . .. . Liminality may involve a complex sequence of episodes in sacred space-time, and 
may also include subversive and ludic (or playful) events ... . In liminality, people "play" with 
the elements of the familiar and defamiliarize them. Novelty emerges from unprecedented 
combinations of familiar elements. 28 
This concept of liminality allows Turner to investigate the connection between ritual and 
novelty ; Turner's vision of ritual is, accordingly, much less integrationist than Geertz ' s. 
Ritual does not portray a dualistic, almost Manichean, struggle between order and void, cosmos 
and chaos, formed and indeterminate, with the former always triumphing in the end. Rather it 
is a transformative self-immolation of order as presently constituted, even sometimes a voluntary 
26Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Rea:;ons of Power in Christianity and Islam 
(Baltimore : Johns Hopkins UP, 1993) 36. 
27Victor Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (New York: Performing Arts 
Journal I]elications , 1982) 25. 
Turner 27. 
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sparagmos or self-dismemberment of order, in the subjunctive depths of liminality . ... Only in 
this way, through destruction and reconstruction , that is, transformation, may an authentic 
reordering come about. Actuality takes the sacrificial plunge into possibility and emerges as a 
different kind of actuality. We are not here in the presence of two like but opposed forces as in 
Manichean myth; rather there is a qualitative incongruence between the contraries engaged. 
Unless the fixing and ordering processes of the adult, sociostructural domain, are liminally 
abandoned and the initiand submits to being broken down to a generalized prima materia , a 
lump of human clay, he cannot be transformed, reshaped to encounter new experiences. 29 
At first glance, Turner seems similar to Geertz in that he posits a pre-existing order which 
becomes chaotic and returns to order. Unlike Geertz, however, Turner recognizes the 
possibility that order might not reassert itself, and that the breakdown of order occurs not 
only within the personal domain of the ritual participant but also among the wider social and 
cultural milieux. Geertz sees the rituals and games of the Balinese strictly in terms of how 
those occasions reflect certain truths about Balinese society; Turner might see them as an 
introduction of the liminal into their lives. Both approaches have their merits and 
disadvantages from a purely anthropological standpoint, but from the standpoint of an analysis 
of play, Turner's approach makes more sense, because he allows for some investigation into 
both the text and context of play. Geertz has rightly criticized Turner's liminal model on the 
grounds that it is too general, "a form for all seasons," which focuses too narrowly on "the 
general movement of things," against which he proposes a '1:ext analogy."30 Turner's 
response : ''For my part I have, indeed, often treated the ritual and juridical symbol systems 
of the Ndembu of Western Zambia as text analogues. But I have tried to locate these texts 
29Tumer 83-84 . 
30Quoted in Turner 106-107. 
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in context of performance, rather than to construe them into abstract , dominantly cognitive 
systems_,m 
This focus on the performance or ritual and play offers an avenue of entry into inquiring 
after the experience of play, not just play-activities or play-as-such . Richard Schechner , a 
dramaturge who was influenced by Turner (and influenced Turner in return), goes further than 
Turner does in emphasizing the inherent activity in play as indispensable to any understanding 
of the phenomenon . 
It's much too limiting, too tight, too certain to build play theories around notions of play genres, 
identifiable "tlrings." Of course there are play genres: efforts to contain, enslave, tame, use, and 
colonize playing. But presently, we need to stop looking so hard at play, or play genres, and 
investigate playing, the ongoing, underlying process of off-balancing, loosening, bending, 
twisting, reconfiguring, and transfonning-the penneating, eruptive/disruptive energy and mood 
below, behind, and to the sides of focused attention.32 
Once we attend to this aspect of play, we will be in a position to appreciate play's power . 
Enacting dreams-or elaborated recollection of dreams-violentl y ruptures the boundary 
between the virtual and the actual . . . . The "as if' of dreaming is by means of performance 
transfonned into the "is" of bodily actions. And once the boundary between dreaming and doing 
is ruptured, all kinds of things-conceptual , fantastic, recollected-spill through in both 
directions .. .. The future of ritual is the continued encounter between imagination and memory 
translated into doable acts of the body.33 
Play, too, is an "encounter between imagination and memory translated into doable acts of 
the body ." What Schechner describes, an investigation of playing, requires first an 
31Turner 107. His italics . 
32Ricbard Schechner, The Future ofRilual : Writings on Culture and Peifomian ce (London : Routledge , 
1993) 43 
~
3Schechner 263 . 
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investigation of what makes playing possible-what it is in the human soul that accounts for 
our love of(and reliance on) play. This is a subject that the paradigms I have analyzed so far 
almost ignore . It is an investigation suited to philosophy. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL P4R4.DIGM OF PIAY 
Subscribers to the historical, developmental, aesthetic and anthropological paradigms 
stumble when they try to account for the paradox of play-the fact that it can manifest itself 
simultaneously as "structure" and "antistructure" (to borrow two terms from Brian Sutton-
Smith). Play-as-experience is fun, joyful, liberating; play-as-game-or-sport is controlled, rule-
bound, disciplined. This riddle is present to both the observer and the participant. Each 
paradigm's members try to account for this puzzle, usually with the result that play only 
seems fun and is in reality rather serious . Many developmentalists, for example. contend that 
the child is actually working when playing, i.e. flexing his or her cognitive or kinetic muscles 
for the purpose of development . Anthropologists and aesthetic theorists attempt to 
extrapolate an understanding of play from ritual or art. but often they dilute the influence of 
play on the individual or his society. For Clifford Geertz. the chaos and jubilation of ritual 
- - - .L 
play is simply a surface phenomenon, part of the whole experience of a community's everyday 
life reflected in the ritual, and not a thing-in-itself; the participants get caught up in the play, 
but it has no real force to change their lives. For Gadamer, the participant has no real 
experience; true play takes place between observer and object, in the ontological realm. not 
the experiential. Philosophers of play favor the language of liberation and freedom, and tend 
to stress this aspect of play over others. 
Unlike the other paradigms, the philosophical paradigm has no central concept-such as 
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developmental psychology, art, or culture-to give it coherence and shape, and is therefore 
less unified in its approach and conclusions. Despite the generality of the term "philosophy," 
the thinkers who fall under this rubric share certain factors in their approach: a common 
interest in the nature of the self in relation to play, for example, and an interest in what makes 
play possible for human beings. Not all philosophers are equal, however, and some start from 
premises which are questionable at best. One of these premises is that pure play is children's 
play., and one of the strongest believers in this premise is Friedrich Nietzsche . 
In one ofNietzsche's early, unfinished works, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks 
(written about the same time as The Birth of Tragedy), he makes explicit his association of 
play with children, freedom, innocence, and Ancient Greece, specifically Heraclitus . He is 
inspired by Heraclitus' fragment 52: "Time (aeon) is a child playing, playing at draughts. 
Kingship belongs to a child." 1 He comments: 
In this world only play, play as artists and children engage in it, exhibits coming-to-be and 
passing away, structuring and destroying, without any moral additive, in forever equal 
innocence . And as children and artists play , so plays the ever-living fire. It construct~ and 
destroys, all in innocence . Such is the game that the aeon plays with itself. Transforming 
itself into water and earth, it builds towers of sand like a child at the sea-shore, piles them up 
and tramples them down .... Not hybris but the ever self-renewing impulse to play calls new 
worlds into being. The child throws its toys away from time to time-and starts again in 
innocent caprice. 2 
Play is creative, open. and innocent. despite Nietzsche's vaguely sinister allusion to the child 
54. 
1Diels and Krantz, eds. Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, v. 1 (Zurich: Weidmann, 1968) 162. 
:zFriedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, trans . M. Cowen (Chicago, 1962) 
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''throwing its toys away." The innocence of play makes it a source of redemption from the 
forces of morality and obligation which prevent us from "self-overcoming" and thus renewing 
ourselves, 
Nietzsche uses this concept of play to elaborate his concept of the authentic person. In 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra speaks of the three metamorphoses of the spirit: the 
cameL th~ lion, and the child. As the camel, the spirit is willing and eager to bear much, and 
so "speeds into the desert"; there, it becomes the lion, where it fights to conquer and be free, 
taking as his ultimate foe the great dragon ''Thou Shalt"; finally, it becomes a child to "create 
new values;' which the lion could not do. 
Why must the preying lion still become a child? The child is innocence and forgetting, a new 
beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel. a first movement, a sacred "Yes." For the game of 
creation, my brothers, a sacred "Yes" is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and he who 
had been lost to the world now conquers his own world. 3 
Rather than focusing on finitude--the natural temporal and physical boundaries that define 
concrete play-activity-Nietzsche is interested in possibility inherent in play. and thus takes 
as his emblem of authenticity the child who plays. The self that emerges from play is the most 
authentic self for Nietzsche, the child: '~A man's maturity-consists in having found again the 
seriousness one had as a child, at play.',4 This playful self is immune from the distorting 
forces of morality (especially Christianity) that weigh down the human spirit; an alternative 
3Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Penguin, 1978) 26-27. 
"Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. trans. Walter Kaufmann 
(New York: Vintage, 1966) 83. 
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to this weight is Neitzsche's notion of a "gay science," a playful rationality: "The lovely beast, 
man, seems to lose its good spirits every time it thinks well: it becomes 'serious.' And 'where 
laughter and gaiety are found, the quality of thought is poor'-that is the prejudice of this 
serious beast against all "gay science. ms 
Nietzsche's approach to play has been interpreted in two main streams in philosophy. One 
stream pursues the idea of the authentic self as the playing self, and the other abandons the 
idea of authenticity altogether, arguin~ that there is no authentic self Herbert Marcuse 
belongs to the first stream . 
The body is important to Nietzsche, as is the radical finitude of our existence. Herbert 
Marcuse, in his Essay on Liberation, takes up where Nietzsche leaves off by recommending 
a transformation of man and society based on an aesthetic of the body and play. In this 
liberated society, ''the sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful become forms of 
existence and thereby the Form of the society itself" 6 In Marcuse's view, ''the aesthetic 
needs have their own social content: they are the claims of the human organism, mind and 
body, for a dimension of fulfillment which can be created only in the struggle" for liberation 
from oppressive institutions. Work (as opposed to play) would disappear: 
The development of the productive forces beyond their capitalist organizations suggests the 
possibility of freedom within the realm of necessity. The quantitative reduction of necessary 
labor could tum into quality (freedom), not in proportion to the reduction but rather the 
transformation of the working day, a transformation in which the stupefying, enervating, pseudo-
5Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufinann and R.J. 
Hollingdale, ed. Walter Kaufinann (New York : Vintage, 1967) 196. 
6Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon, 1969) 25 . 
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automatic jobs of capitalist progress would be abolished. 7 
The new, authentic self that emerges from this society somewhat resembles Zarathustra's 
description : 
The construction of such a society presupposes a type of man with a different sensitivity as well 
as consciousness: men who would speak a different language, have different gestures, follow 
different impulses; men who have developed an instinctual barrier against cruelty, brutality, 
ugliness .. .. Men and women who have the good conscience of being human, tender, sensuous, 
who are no longer ashamed of themselves . . . . The imagination of such men and women would 
fashion their reason and tend to make the process of production a process of creation. 8 
By liberating society. the self has a context where it is free to be authentic, to express its 
natural creativity in "an environment in which the nonaggressive, erotic, receptive faculties 
of man, in harmony with the consciousness of freedom, strive for the pacification of man and 
nature ."9 Play, taken to Marcuse's utopian level, gives birth to the "new type of man," the 
authentic self Unfortunately, Marcuse never quite says what the content of this self is beyond 
its sensual, placid nature, except-strangely enough-that it drifts toward chaos. 10 
~~use 21. 
~"ii,cuse 21. 
1 08;!8v/i1~e, who pamts a similar utopia of play and aesthetics in his essay .. The Soul ofl\rlan 
Under Socialism, " is more explicit. In Wilde, as in Marcuse, we are all freed from labor through machines 
which work for us . In this all-peivading atmosphere ofleisure , society, which "forces man into a groove in 
which he cannot freely develop what is wonderful , and fascinating, and delightful in him," can be transfigured . 
His portrait of the authentic self: "It will be a matvellous thing-the true personality of man-when we see it. 
It will grow naturally and simply , tlowerlike , or as a tree grows . It will not be at discord . It will never argµe or 
dispute. It will not prove things . It will know everything . And yet it will not busy itself about knowledge. It 
will have wisdom. Its value will not be measured by material things. It will have nothing. And yet it will have 
everything . .. The personality of man will be vecy wonderful. It will be as wonderful as the personality of a 
child. " De Profimdis and Other Writings (London : Penguin, 1986) 26-27. 
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Marcuse is in the minority by choosing to follow Nietzsche's example in this stream of 
interpretation . More populous by far are the interpreters that deny the self any authenticity, 
indeed any existence, based on their observations ofplay's freedom and openness. Jacques 
Derrida, for example, in discussing his critique of the "structurality of structure," is explicit 
in his debt to Nietzsche : ''If we wished to . . . recall those authors in whose discourse this 
[decentering] has kept most closely to its most radical formulation, we doubtless would have 
to cite the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, the critique of the concepts of Being and 
truth, for which were substituted the concepts of play, interpretation, and sign (sign without 
present truth) .... "u Play has a central role in his critique of"centered structures." 
The function of [the} center was not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure-one 
cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized structure-but above all to make sure that the 
organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure. 
By orienting and organizing the coherence of the system. the center of a structure permits the 
play of its elements inside the total form . .. . The concept of centered structure is in fact the 
concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of a 
fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which itself is beyond the reach of play. And 
on the basis of this certitude anxiety can be mastered, for anxiety is invariably the result of a 
certain mode of being implicated in the game, of being caught in the game, of being as it were 
at stake in the game from the outset. 12 
Derrida clearly thinks that we cannot avoid getting caught in the game, since the center is an 
illusion, and ''the absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of 
signification infinitely." 13 The proper reaction to this loss of center (which we never had) is 
"Nietzschean cifftrmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the 
11 Jacques Derrida. Writing and Difference, trans . Alan Bass (Chicago : U of Chicago P, 1978) 280. !i2~cla 278-279. 
· uerrida 280 . 
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innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and 
without origin which is offered to an active interpretation. "14 
Derrida, by invoking "active interpretation," assumes the existence of an interpreter, but 
those deconstructionists that follow Derrida deny even this shade of firmness and 
permanence. John Caputo, for example, denies the self any stability. 
The "self' is something which we defme in terms of its self-identity . Yet what seems to 
characteriz.e "us" above all is non-identity, difference, our power or, better, our vulnerability to 
sp~ off into the abyss. The self is precisely not that which always abides in itself, self-
identically present to itself, but that which breaks under the strain, gives way to the pull of the 
flux, which is constantly being divested of its illusions, tormented by the unconscious, 
constantly being tricked by its history and its language. . . . The "self' is much more a place of 
disruption, irruption, solicitation. 15 
The kind of play that emerges from this constantly self-subverting environment is remarkably 
general; indeed, it seems that everything is play, as described by Jacques Ehrmann: ''Play is 
not played against a background of a fixed, stable reality which would serve as its standard. 
All reality is caught up in the play of the concepts which designate it. . . . Reality is thus not 
capable of being objectified, nor subjectified. . . . The player-that is, each of us-is at once 
the subject and object of the play. The pronouns L you, he are the different modes of play 
structure. The subjectivity-objectivity dualism is abolished because it is inoperative . "16 
1
"Derrida 292. 
15Jobn D. Caputo , Radical Hermeneutics : Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project 
(Bloomington, IN : Indiana UP, 1987) 289. 
16Jacques Ehrmann, "Homo Ludens Revisited," trans. Cathy and Phil Lewis, Game, Play, literature , 
ed. J. Hermann (Boston : Beacon , 1968) 56. 
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This kind of language, when applied to play, results in misunderstanding . On the one 
hand, Caputo argues that there is no such thing as «self," which would mean that the concept 
of the player playing and actively using his or her "self' for the purposes of play is ruled out. 
On the other hand, Ehrmann argues that the players do have identity-in fact, "each of us" 
is a player-· but the play is totally indefinite, general, and all-encompassing. The 
deconstructionist view of the whole affair is backwards: the self is not a playerless play or a 
nexus of linguistic and historical games without content or substance, but rather the self is 
given content precisely when it plays as a player. An active engagement in play causes the 
player to become simultaneously deeply involved in himself (in both his physical and mental 
attention) and removed from himself (in that this attention is focused on external activity). 
There is an ambiguity inherent in the activity of play related to the self, but the self is not 
automatically lost as soon as play begins. James B. Hans expresses the true role of placing 
one's "self' at risk: 
The primary criterion for play would seem to be ... openness, though again, openness does not 
mean a lack of orientation-it only means a willingness to put that orientation into question . 
. . . There is not doubt that openness implies risk, that whether the play be conversational, 
sexual. or of some other kind, one's own status is at stake. But the willingness to forego one's 
own territmy, to be willing to pass beyond what one knows one is capable of, is the fundamental 
feature of play. And although this may be a risk in terms of "losing face" in the eyes of others, 
the understanding achieved is usually sufficient incentive to put oneself at stake in play.17 
Derrida correctly points out that risk and anxiety are closely linked to play, but Hans is also 
correct when he point out that openness and lack or orientation are not synonymous . 
17James B. Hans, The Play of the World (Amherst, MA: U ofMassachusettsP, 1981) 12~13. 
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Openness alone is not sufficient for an understanding of play, however; it must be a specific 
kind of openness available to players . 
Drew Hyland has characterized this as "responsive openness ." 
I want to ask after what play is that it appeals so much to human being as human, and at the 
same time to make my account self-referential. I want to ask after the stance of play. . . . It is 
a mode of comportment oward things, a mode of being-in-the-world, which although not utterly 
peculiar, is nevertheless different from our mode of comportment when we consider ourselves 
not to be playing. . . . In the play situations I am called upon, or call upon myself, to have a 
heightened sense of openness toward my surroundings . ... I have to be capable of responding 
to that openness in a way called for by the situation, and my success as a [player] depends in 
good measure on my capacity to respond appropriately to each developing situation. 18 
"Responsive openness'' is not a definition, but is only intended "reflectively to clarify our 
experience of play." What Hyland calls "the stance of play" is "grounded in, and so flows 
from, the nature of human being itself" This nature, as Hyland sees it, is paradoxical: 
incomplete and overflowing, monadic an relational, dominant and submissive. 
Suppose we were simply complete, that we "are what we are and not another thing.,. We would 
then not be called upon to open, since, lacking nothing, we would need to be open to nothing. 
Nor, lacking the impetus of overflowing, would we be responsive, in so far as a response is just 
such an outpouring of ex-pressing of ourselves. . . . If we were utterly monadic [we would have] 
no need for openness to others. Our essential relationality calls for our orientation toward others 
in the mode of openness. . . . Our responsiveness, in turn, flows from our overfullness, and so 
from what we are "in ourselves" (and] so in our natures as monadic. . . . Dominance moderated 
by openness becomes responsiveness. Submission moderated by responsiveness becomes 
openness. Held together in a unity, they become the very spirit, the stance, of play. [This stance 
is] not the way we always are as an empirical matter but the way we are in so far as we 
uDrew llyland, The Question of Play (Lanham , MD: University Press of America, 1984) 45-4 7. 
Hyland is here speaking of the intentional characteristics of play, rather than the extensional: "Play has more to 
do with our stance toward a given activity than with the specific behavioral details of the activity itself ' (49). 
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adequately fulfill our natures. 19 
'"Not all instances of responsive openness are play," however; our experience of play has 
other characteristics. One is finitude, manifested by rules and the limits of our bodies in space 
and time, and another is the reverse offinitude, possibility, manifested by the body's powerful 
meaning within the play and the experience of complete immersion in a totality . In terms of 
play's value, "in one sense, play is inherently valuable; we recognize in the stance of 
responsive openness so characteristic of play a stance that is desirable whatever we do. But 
this 'whatever we do' is subject to other standards and judgments of value . . . . Play is 
valuable, but not the standard of value; it is a good, but it is not the Good. "20 
Hyland's theory of responsive openness, based on our paradoxical human natures and 
experienced as finitude and possibility, is, I believe, the fullest account of play offered of all 
the different theories and definitions examined so far. Play is an activity of the mind and the 
soul, as the developmentalists suggest, not merely an irrational pursuit . We don't simply play 
with reason, we are reasoning players. Also, the experience of play is a uniquely human 
experience, and an understanding of play should take into account the experience of the 
player, as the aesthetic theorists indicate . The anthropologists point out the connection 
19i-Iyland 50-62 . Hyland hinges much on his oppositions of incomplete / overflowing, monadic / 
relational, dominant./ submissive, but doesn't illustrate them as well as he could. The implication is that we 
are paradoxical in such a way that comes out in our normal relations with each other, including play . Hyland 
also implies that we can somehow moderate these sides of ourselves ("Dominance moderated by openness ... 
Submission moderated by responsiveness") and hold them "together in a unity'' somehow, which is the "spirit" 
of play. When they are not in a unity, that suggests non-play, and which comes first-initiation of play 
followed by unity or vice versa-is not quite clear . What is clear is that our ability to enter the stance of play 
depends qn our paradoxicalness as human beings . 
·'1-lyland 72. 
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between play and finitude / possibility; ritual play is embodied play, done within the confines 
of a special space and time, and yet, in so far as it is liminal, reveals a possibility and creativity 
meshed with structure. 
To the various paradigms, Hyland brings the notion that play is an expression and an 
enactment, of lived human reality. Unlike Geertz's analysis of the Balinese cockfight (another 
representation of a specific human reality) which suggests that the proceedings are only 
"really reaf' to the cocks, play is obviously "really real" to everyone involved-including the 
spectators, if any-while simultaneously being ~'only play." Someone playing a game has his 
attention focused sharply on strategy and observation; someone rolling down a hill is keenly 
aware of his or her own physical presence. Play straddles so many conceptual and empirical 
categories that it seems life itself is the only vessel large enough to contain its paradoxes; one 
ofHyland's strengths is his preservation of this complexity in his scheme. 
Robert L. Simon, in a review ofHyland's book The Question of Play, criticizes Hyland's 
use of the term "play" at all: "Hyland avoids claiming either that adoption of the stance of 
play is a necessary or sufficient condition of play. At most, it is a normative standard; play 
is more or less defective if not engaged in from such a perspective. Indeed, other activities 
(perhaps frequently) manifest the stance of play. So Hyland is not claiming that the stance 
is restricted to those activities, such as sports or games, commonly placed under the heading 
of play. In what sense, then, does consideration of the stance of play illuminate play itself, 
rather than a host of other activities with which it may be associated? Why even call it play, 
rather than the stance of unalienated work, or perhaps better, just the stance of responsive 
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openness?"21 Simon answers his own question, in a way that seems appropriate : "Without 
committing [Hyland} to an analysis of play, [another argument] might indicate that his study 
does shed special light on play itself According to this suggestion, play is the paradigm 
human activity in which responsive openness is exhibited. Moreover, this is not mere 
contingent fact but reveals something fundamental about the character of play itself That is, 
play is especially expressive of our nature. "22 A more serious criticism is Hyland' s reliance 
on his own view of human nature, which he doesn't spell out as clearly as he could. If one 
disagrees with Hyland's view that we are essentially paradoxical, or that we even have a 
human nature (as a deconstructionist would), then his argument deflates. Nevertheless, it 
seems to grasp truths about play which most attempts at inquiry fumble. 
The inquiry should not stop here, however; Hyland is not the last word . I favor his 
approach because, as he says, the philosophical standpoint is "more fundamental" than the 
others: '~ach of the previous standpoints treats its object of investigation precisely as an 
o~ject of investigation, even and especially human beings. As such, they already assume a 
fundamental decision about the being of the entity being examined, namely, that it is an entity, 
an object, which can be appropriately examined by the methods of the sciences, which in 
every case assume that the object of study is a 'thing'. . . . Obviously, then, there is a prior 
investigation necessary which will open up to investigation the being of what is being 
21Simon, Robert L. "The Question of Play, by Drew Hyland ." Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 14 
(1987) 68. 
22Simon 69. His emphasis . 
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investigated , will ask after the nature of human beings who play. ,m This aspect of the 
philosophical paradigm accounts for its greater success in integrating the various aspects of 
play into one conceptual framework. One reason I include the other paradigms, however , 
is to show that no inquiry into play is complete without considering a plurality of vantage 
points. Coming to an understanding about human nature is not enough; play does have to 
do with psychology, society and art . I cannot ignore those perspectives, even if they are 
incomplete, or rather, more incomplete than philosophy. 
I don't think that a complete theory of play is possible or desirable. Neither play nor 
human existence are ever finished, in the sense of being completed for all time. Play is a 
fundamental part of the life of every human being, yet it escapes the gravity of dense analysis 
and theory. The paradigms compared and evaluated in this paper each contribute something 
to an understanding of play, but a true understanding of play cannot be articulated in those 
terms . Play as a lived reality uses one's reason and one's body, and resists efforts to 
comprehend it as purely one thing or another. At the core of play lies an enigma that defies 
language and is greater than the sum of its paradigms. 
23Hyland 43 . His emphasis. 
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